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Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has witnessed a diversification of its membership in terms of 
the depth, width, matter and speed of integration (Phinnemore, 2007: 31; Stubb, 1996). 
Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) all have differentiated with 
regard to Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) or the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), or both (Junge, 2007: 393). Countries are often deemed to be rational actors and 
thus probably have their reasons for opting out of certain fields of EU integration (Naurin 
& Lindahl, 2010: 486). However, differentiated integration is likely to be accompanied 
by disadvantages. 
Firstly, scholars believe differentiated integration is at odds with the original idea of 
European Integration: ever-widening and ever-deepening integration that is to be equally 
implemented by all members (Adler-Nissen, 2008: 665; Naurin & Lindahl, 2010: 486; 
Stubb, 1996; Junge, 2007: 393; among others). Secondly, on issues related to 
differentiated integration, member states would lose voting rights in the Council of 
Ministers (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2010: 138). Thirdly, EU member states 
with differentiated integration risk their reputation as attractive coalition partners (Alder-
Nissen, 2008: 664-665). Fourthly, the “unity of EU law” could be at risk (Kölliker, 2006: 
4). Fifthly, despite the differentiating integration, the EU is still in crisis – moreover, 
differentiation was not introduced as an indefinite phenomenon (Piris, 2012: 3). As a 
result of these points, several EU core values might be jeopardised (Junge, 2007: 399). 
Despite the amount of interest in what differentiated integration is and what it could 
do to the EU’s core ideals, there is little empirical work on its consequences (Adler-
Nissen, 2008: 664). Kölliker asserts that “the bulk of the work done so far is of a 
conceptual, descriptive or prescriptive character” (2006: 3). Holzinger and 
Schimmelfennig note that:  
 
“[T]he focus has so far been on theorizing the consequences for future 
integration in the same area (…). In addition, however, research should 
also address the immediate policy effects of differentiation” (2012: 302; 
emphasis added). 
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Based on this, the goal of this paper is to link the theoretical and normative concerns in 
the literature to empirical analysis of how differentiated integration “relate[s] to the social 
and political practices to the EU” (Adler-Nissen, 2008: 666). 
The focus of this paper is on the relation between differentiated integration as an 
independent variable (IV) and member state access to European Commission (EC) 
advisory committees as a dependent variable (DV). Of course, there are several ways in 
which states differentiate, spread over multiple policy areas (Stubb, 1996). As such, in 
addition to a general effect, there might be a particular effect for particular forms and 
particular EC policy areas. Based on the above introduction, this paper will deal with the 
following research question: 
 
How does differentiated integration affect the access of member states to 
EC advisory committees, and what are the differences between policy areas 
and the several existing forms of differentiation? 
 
Access is used here in the formal and tangible sense as “the incorporation of an 
interest group [or government department] into EU-policy-making by (…) institutions” 
(Eising, 2007a: 386). Access to arenas facilitates input: being present at the negotiation 
table gives you at least a theoretical ability to influence outcomes. The EC is very 
important in agenda-setting and legislation (Moravcsik, 2002: 604), so access to EC 
advisory committees is crucial for influencing policy (Christiansen & Larsson, 2007: 4; 
Egeberg, 2007: 140). If member states differentiate, they risk their reputation as good 
coalition partners in the EU’s policy arenas. In that case, the EC – being the gatekeeper 
for access – could be hesitant to give differentiated states ‘sufficient’ access. Either other 
member states pressure the EC into doing so, or the EC has an agenda of its own being 
the guardian of European integration (Thomson, 2008: 171; Egeberg, 2007: 151; 
Christiansen, 1997: 79). 
In order to answer this question, this paper is structured as follows. This paper will 
deal with its main concepts and definitions first. Subsequently, this paper will deal with 
existing theory and derive its hypothesis from this theory. Thirdly, a methodology section 
will discuss how the aforementioned large-N study will measure ‘access’, as well as how 
the differences in this can be measured and how these differences are caused. Finally, a 
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results section will answer this paper’s main research question and discuss to what extent 
the hypotheses hold. 
 
Concepts 
This chapter deals with the following concepts: differentiated integration; the workings of 
EC advisory committees; and, finally, ‘access’ to these policy arenas and what its causes 
and effects are. 
The start of codified differentiated integration was the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Adler-
Nissen, 2008: 665). According to the literature, a large part of differentiated integration is 
rooted in Euroscepticism. For instance, Sitter notes that voter dissatisfaction with 
European integration in Denmark and Sweden forced their governments to reject full 
EMU participation (2001: 22). Whereas its origins may be pointed to empirically, 
differentiated integration is heavily criticised on a normative level (see also: De Neve, 
2007: 505; Junge, 2007: 392). However, some scholars argue that differentiated 
integration should be considered as an alternative design for an EU suitable for 
enlargement and the accompanying increase in heterogeneity (Sutter, 2000: 43). In this 
respect, the relevance of this paper is to show whether differentiated integration amounts 
to a trade-off in the loss of access and the loss of sovereignty. 
Differentiated integration is defined in three categories, following Stubb (1996). The 
reason for that is that these different modes of differentiation are not equal in scope and 
nature (Stubb, 1996: 287). The importance of this distinction in scope and nature 
becomes apparent when considering the idea that a ‘bigger’ differentiation supposedly 
has a bigger effect on access. Stubb distinguishes between multi-speed (differentiation in 
Time); variable geometry (differentiation in Space); and Europe à la carte 
(differentiation in Matter) (1996: 285). The main difference between multi-speed and the 
other two is that a multi-speed Europe does not “admit to permanent differentiation” 
(1996: 287). The main difference between variable geometry and à la carte lies in the 
scope of the common ground outside of the differentiation (1996: 288). Variable 
geometry is a more integrationist concept, with even a positive evaluation of 
differentiation: a ‘hard core’ driving integration in unexplored areas (1996: 288).  
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In Stubb’s classification, multi-speed differentiation is the ‘softest’ form of 
differentiation and à la carte integration the ‘hardest’ form (1996: 288). According to the 
theory, this difference in how ‘hard’ the differentiation is should show in its effects on the 
DVs listed in this paper. The most prominent examples of the three types of differentiated 
integration are listed in Table 1, below. It is possible for one policy area to witness 
multiple forms of differentiation. For instance, for Sweden the EMU is a case of multi-
speed integration with a de facto opt-out (see also: Sutter, 2000: 41) and for Denmark and 
the United Kingdom (UK) they are de jure opt-outs: an à la carte differentiation (Adler-
Nissen, 2009: 63-64). 
 
 State/States Multi-Speed Variable 
Geometry 
À la carte 
Denmark   EMU, CDSP1, citizenship, 
AFSJ, Foreign policy 
United 
Kingdom 
 Case-by-case 
opt-in: AFSJ 
EMU, Social charter2, AFSJ, 
Schengen, Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
Ireland  Case-by-case 
opt-in: AFSJ 
Abortion, Schengen, AFSJ 
Sweden EMU (de facto opt-out)  Snus 
New EU-27 
members 
EMU3, Schengen (Romania, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus) 
 Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Cz, Pol) 
Table 1: A list of differentiated integration of three types, per member state 
 
EC advisory committees (or ‘expert groups’) are divided over several types and 
configurations (see Table 2, below). The focus is on advisory committees, not to be 
confused with comitology committees. The main difference is that comitology is part of 
the implementation of EU policy, rather than formulation (Wessels, 1998: 209-210). 
Advisory committees are “usually composed of national officials and other experts” 
(Egeberg, 2007: 150). The central mechanism for deciding who gets ‘access’ to EC 
advisory committees is crucial for this paper. The gatekeeper for the allocation of seats 
on EC advisory committees is ‘the Commission’ itself: they have “a rather free hand” in 
forming and filling these bodies as they please (Larsson & Murk, 2007: 64). The Chairs 
                                                
1 CDSP: Common Defence & Security Policy. 
2 This was abolished by the Blair government in 1995 (Schmidt, 2001: 259). 
3 As of January 1st, 2011, this includes Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
and Romania. 
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and the secretarial staff are provided by the EC (Egeberg, 2007: 151). The EC decides on 
the structure of committees (as shown in Table 2). The EC also decides on how “the work 
performed by an expert group shall be used” (Larsson & Murk, 2007: 73). Subsequently, 
the EC invites member states and/or organisations. Three types of group compositions are 
acknowledged by the EC: groups with only national administrators; groups with only 
non-governmental representatives; and mixed bodies (Larsson & Murk, 2007: 77). 
Crucially, these groups can be either inclusive or exclusive, where the exclusive groups 
need not include groups or administrators from all member states (Larsson & Murk, 
2007: 78). Open access governmental committees usually involve the automatic 
invitation of all 27 member states. 
 
Organisational 
character 
Informal Formal 
Group type Temporal Permanent 
Scope Broad Limited 
Access Open Closed 
Membership Government Non-governmental Private person Mixed 
Location One DG Multiple DGs (one lead DG) 
Drafting new legislation Exchanging views for the EC with third 
parties 
Task 
Monitoring existing regulations Providing expertise on implementation 
Table 2: The nature of EC advisory committees (source: European Commission, 2012) 
 
Crucially, Christiansen & Larsson believe that both governmental and non-governmental 
actors have big incentives to be on board because a large part of the agenda-setting power 
rests with the EC (2007: 4). The outcomes of these meetings are often lent weight by the 
fact that they were the result of ‘expert’ deliberations – as such, it is crucial to influence 
them while they are in the EC committee stage (Christiansen & Larsson, 2007: 5). 
Christiansen & Larsson assert that sometimes it is not clear whether states treat the 
committees like bargaining arenas or that they form their preferences based on the 
meetings of these expert committees (2007: 7). Dür notes that there are four ‘channels of 
influence’: direct lobbying, outside lobbying, selection of decision-makers and wielding 
structural power (Dür, 2008: 561). Two out of these four channels are directly related to 
access: firstly, in order to influence policy outcomes, states need to be selected as 
decision-makers. Secondly, they need to lobby directly vis-à-vis EC officials, and being 
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present at the negotiation tables of EC advisory committees is probably one of the most 
direct ways of lobbying in the EU policy process. 
Central to this paper is the definition of ‘access’. Eising defines access as “a 
successful attempt of an interest group to approach the EU institutions or the 
incorporation of an interest group into EU policy-making by these institutions” (2007a: 
386). Eising uses this definition to analyse access of interest groups and (groups of) 
business ventures, but the focus in this paper is both on member states and on interest 
groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and business ventures. Unlike Eising, 
who believes access can be either informal or formal (2007a: 386), this paper uses only 
formal access. The obvious reason for restricting the definition to formal access is that 
this paper relies on data comprising registered access to committees. While these 
committees can be both ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ – in the EC’s definition – the fact that all 
participants are registered formalises the access to these committees substantially. Eising 
also includes the possibility of a “successful attempt (…) to approach the EU institutions” 
(2007a: 386), which is excluded for two reasons. On the one hand this form of access is 
more like ‘being in touch’ than inclusion in a decision-making arena. On the other hand, 
the data used for this paper does not include the communication history of interest 
groups, member states and EU institutions. 
The literature on the determinants and consequences of ‘access’ focuses mostly on the 
access of businesses and NGOs (Eising, 2004; Eising, 2007a; Eising, 2007b; Eising, 
2009; Broscheid & Coen, 2003). One exception is Gornitzka & Sverdrup’s study of 
advisory committee heterogeneity – but again, their study does not include member state 
access as an important variable (2008). Studies of member states and European decision-
making focus mostly on outcomes in terms of policy ‘power’ and ‘influence’ (Arregui & 
Thomson, 2009; Selck & Kuipers, 2005; Michalowitz, 2007; Sutter, 2000; among 
others); or on modes of interaction in terms of diplomatic strategies (Adler-Nissen, 2008; 
Adler-Nissen, 2009; Grøn & Wivel, 2011; among others). By contrast, the point of 
departure for the analysis of member states within the framework of multi-level 
governance does not pay much attention to initial conditions for between-state variation 
of influence and power. By contrast, this paper argues access is crucial there. One paper 
does analyse access of nationally-based bureaucrats in a differentiated EU, but focuses 
 8 
more on their identity or identities: are bureaucrats loyal to national interests, specific 
interests or to a supranational ideal (Trondal & Veggeland, 2003)? Their main conclusion 
is that EU-membership does move national officials more into a supranational role than 
non-membership, comparing Norway and Sweden (Trondal & Veggeland, 2003: 73). 
This paper, unlike the Trondal & Veggeland paper, looks at the determinants rather than 
at the consequences of differences in access of different member states. 
 
Theory and hypotheses 
In order to come up with reasonable hypotheses, the existing literature will be examined 
in detail. The most common normative claim is that the ‘core idea’ of what the EU is, is 
jeopardised by differentiated integration. This core idea is the ‘ever closer union’ (Adler-
Nissen, 2008: 665; Naurin & Lindahl, 2010: 486; Stubb, 1996; Junge, 2007: 393; among 
others). Two broad empirical claims flow from this. Firstly, it is thought that the 
reputations of member states that differentiate risk their reputation. This means 
differentiated integration could affect the overall degree of access. The EC is engaged in 
political struggles with national governments and other EU institutions over many 
decisions – including the distribution of access (Smith, 2004: 202). Secondly, stronger 
differentiation might also imply stronger effects on access. In addition, there are several 
expectations in the literature that do not relate directly to these two categories but 
nonetheless could have an impact on the distribution of seats and on the distribution of 
governmental seats. In particular, this could mean that for different DGs the effects on 
access are different. This will be treated as a third category of expectations. 
In the first category, Naurin & Lindahl note that “power relationships and coalition-
building between the member states may be affected” by what Naurin & Lindahl call the 
‘free-rider effect’ (2010: 486-487). This effect means member states that differentiate 
build up a reputation as free-riders by not participating fully in domestically unpopular 
programmes but making a profit from integration nonetheless. However, Naurin & 
Lindahl argue that ‘network capital’ can overcome bad reputations (2010: 505). The 
Swedish government is reported to have a ‘constructive’ reputation despite having a 
highly Eurosceptic population (Lindahl & Naurin, 2005: 66). Secondly, Adler-Nissen 
says most scholars argue that there is a trade-off between “autonomy and influence” for 
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differentially integrated member states (2008: 666; 2009: 64). Her conclusion is that 
differentially integrated member states use several broad diplomatic strategies to ‘cover-
up’ the side-effects of differentiation (2008: 680-681). Fletcher, on the other hand, argues 
that Eurosceptiscism in the UK has “framed the policy responses and bargaining 
positions of successive UK governments” (2009: 71). Similarly, it is argued that Sweden 
often takes a relatively extreme position in policy negotiations (Selck & Kuipers, 2005: 
159). Interpretations of which reputations are held by individual member states are 
disputed by some scholars. Fletcher (2009: 78) and Adler-Nissen (2009: 62) assert that 
the UK is generally considered to be an unpopular coalition partner. Adler-Nissen also 
asserts that Denmark is considered to be an unpopular coalition partner (2009: 63). 
However, Naurin and Lindahl believe that the UK, Denmark and Sweden are able to 
compensate for their bad reputation adequately (2010: 505; Lindahl & Naurin, 2005: 83). 
The results of the empirical studies listed above show that while it seems reasonable for 
differentiated integration to have an effect on the distribution of influence and access, in 
practice member states appear to be able to find ways to compensate for these effects 
through diplomatic activity. Based on these analyses, it makes sense not to assume that 
differentiated integration does not matter if member states try to ‘make up for it’. Finally, 
all hypotheses include the possibility that while all member states have interest groups on 
expert committees, some have fewer government representatives. This is also argued by 
Egeberg et al., who claim that fellow countrymen representing interest groups are 
considered noteworthy coalition partners in advisory committees by less than 20% of 
national officials; whereas fellow government representatives are considered to be the 
best coalition partners in committees (2003: 33). Moreover, non-government experts 
might have agendas that diverge from what governments deem to be the national interest 
(Schneider et al., 2007: 123-124). Based on these expectations, H1 states that 
differentiated integration in general will have a negative effect on access: 
 
H1: Member states that have differentiated integration (lower X), have 
lower shares of access to European Commission (EC) advisory committees 
(lower Y1) or a lower share of government access to these advisory 
committees (different Y2). 
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For the second category, the EC is expected to influence the distribution of access. 
Crucially, the EC is reported to be unwilling to believe in Sweden’s compensatory 
strategies after their refusal to join the EMU (Lindahl & Naurin, 2005: 79). Secondly, 
Robert argues that many scholars disregard the agenda the EC has on its own, especially 
regarding Eastern Europe (2004: 17). The EC is strongly acting to advance the position of 
Eastern European countries in need of development, and will act in various policy 
instruments to achieve these aims (Robert, 2004: 19). This would include ‘positively 
discriminating’ them on advisory committee seats, for example – which would change 
the balance of access in favour of ‘new’ lagging member states vis-à-vis older 
differentiated states. Thirdly, there is a debate raging among scholars of the EU on the 
intergovernmentalist vs. supranationalist nature of politics – and this does not forego the 
EC. Quaglia argues that some parts of the EU are more supranational and some are more 
intergovernmental in nature, with differences even occurring within institutions (2008: 
575). Egeberg agrees with this point of view, considering it to be relevant for EC 
advisory committees (2007: 140). Grøn & Wivel note that it is often believed that smaller 
states are traditionally given a platform by the EC (2011: 525). However, Grøn & Wivel 
disagree with this belief, saying that recent developments make the EU less mindful of 
smaller states’ stakes and more majoritarian in nature (2011: 523). Thomson, however, 
expects the EC act “[in] favour [of] small and medium member states slightly more than 
large member states” (2008: 189). In line with Thomson, Puetter expects that expert 
committees are more consensus-oriented than other EU bodies (2008: 480). This could 
lead to a lower degree of politicisation of the degree of access than expected by some 
scholars. However, following the aforementioned categorisation by Stubb, this 
politicisation of access can differ per type of differentiation: do opt-outs affect access 
more than weaker forms of differentiation? H2 tests this reasoning: 
 
H2: The effect of a lower X producing a lower Y1 (or different Y2) is 
stronger for harder forms of differentiation in integration: ∆Y for Á la 
carte differentiation > ∆Y for Variable geometry differentiation > ∆Y for 
Multi-speed differentiation. 
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The third category consists of five main arguments. Firstly, it is often argued that the 
bad reputation factor can be overcome by ‘network capital’ (Naurin & Lindahl, 2010: 
505; Arregui & Thomson, 2009: 670). Secondly, it is argued that smaller states have 
relatively more bargaining success (akin to influence) because their interests are narrower 
(Arregui & Thomson, 2009: 670; Grøn & Wivel, 2011: 530). Thirdly, Grøn & Wivel 
argue that state administrative capacity is crucial, both in terms of quality of the experts 
sent to committees and in terms of the links with EU staff (2011: 533). Eising underlines 
this by saying that providing good information or good arguments gets you on board in 
the EU, rather than raw power or money (2007a: 386). Fourthly, it is argued that for most 
of the newer EU-27 members, NGOs and other non-governmental actors are 
underdeveloped when compared to their EU-15 counterparts. This “contributes to a 
shortage of suitable candidates from such constituencies” for EC advisory committees 
(Heard-Lauréote, 2008: 595). Fifthly and finally, Adler-Nissen argues that EMU 
integration leads to more tangible differences between members and non-members in that 
specific policy area, whereas less is known about the JHA area (2009: 64). As such, it 
could be that the effects of differentiated negotiation on the distribution of access differ 
per policy area. This echoes the idea that some DGs follow a more intergovernmentalist 
logic and others a more supranationalist one (Quaglia, 2008: 575). Linked to this, H3 
expects access to be affected by differentiated integration differently per policy area: 
 
H3: The effect of a lower X producing a lower Y1 (or different Y2) is 
especially strong for policy areas related to differentiated integration 
(condition Z). 
 
In addition to this, three main ‘intervening variables’ can be distilled from this theory 
section: ‘state size’ as a determinant of access and influence; ‘state capacity’ (network 
capital); and, finally, the duration of membership. 
So how does this mechanism work in practice? These expectations would imply, for 
example, that Sweden – being a lower X country than, say, Finland – will have a lower Y 
than Finland. However, for Denmark, this effect would be even more severe since their 
differentiation is stronger. This effect supposedly shows even more in areas related to 
monetary and fiscal policy because these are areas fulfilling ‘condition Z’. Because the 
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Danish de jure opt-out (à la carte differentiation) on EMU is ‘harder’ than the Swedish 
de facto opt-out (multi-speed differentiation), the effect should be stronger in Denmark 
than in Sweden. 
The expectations based on the hypotheses are listed in Table 3 (below).  H1 
corresponds with the difference between the left-most column and the middle column in 
Table 3. H2 corresponds with the vertical differences in the middle column in Table 3. 
H3 corresponds with the difference between the middle and right columns in Table 3. 
 
 
Form of X 
High X country Low X country Low X (if Z) 
No differentiated 
integration 
Highest Y - - 
Multi-speed - Slightly low Y Lower Y 
Variable Geometry - Low Y Lower Y 
À la carte - Lower Y Lowest Y 
Table 3: Expectations on the relation between X, Y and condition Z 
 
Methodology and Data 
For the methodology of this paper, three things are crucial. Firstly, the nature of the 
quantitative data used in this paper will be discussed. Secondly, the operationalisation of 
the IV and DVs will be dealt with. Thirdly and finally, the quantitative stage of the 
analysis will be discussed. In particular, the selection of the statistical method is 
important. 
The dataset used in this paper is a dataset of the registry of the presence of all persons 
of all nations and organisations on seats of advisory committees of the European 
Commission, collected in March and April 2010. Included in this information is the name 
of the overarching Directorate General (DG), the name of the specific advisory 
committee, the nature of the specific advisory committee (informal/formal, 
permanent/temporary) and their role (NGO representative, business representative, 
central government representative, and so on). The total N of the dataset is 15448 seats. 
These 15448 seats are distributed over 27 DGs, listed in Appendix 1 with their respective 
number of seats. The main units of analysis in H1, H2 and H3 are the amount of seats per 
member state; the amount of seats per member state per DG; and the relative presence of 
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central government officials among these seats per member state and per member state 
per DG. 
With the IV in this paper being degree of integration of member states into the EU – 
or rather, the degree of non-integration (X) – a classification of countries’ relative non-
integration is vital. There is a difference between differentiated countries in their nature, 
degree and scope of differentiation. The theory on the legal, institutional and political 
nature of differentiated integration discussed above argues that multi-speed 
differentiation is the ‘weakest’ form of differentiation and à la carte integration is the 
strongest form of differentiation. Based on this, this paper uses the differentiations listed 
in Table 1 to classify the member states’ IV ‘figures’ in Table 4, below. There is a 
division into two groups that have a ‘lower X’. Firstly, the classification in Table 4 uses 
two types of ‘having a lower X’. On the one hand, there are member states that have a 
lower degree of EU-integration as a result of their recent entry – they are not yet deemed 
to be ‘ready’ to join all facets of European integration. This is called a lower X as a result 
of lagging in integration. This category of ‘new member states’ is limited to the EU-25 
and EU-27 enlargements of the 2000s. On the other hand, some member states have 
chosen not to participate in certain areas. This conscious lower integration is simply 
called having a low or lower X. For both types, the classification of X is an ordinal 
ranking because it is not possible to ‘quantify’ the degree of integration. Crucially, the 
two types are treated as separate ordinal classifications because it is impossible to 
collapse them into one group. 
Lagging is highest for Bulgaria and Romania, the two newest member states who are 
deemed not yet ready to join the Euro and also not deemed ready to join Schengen. 
Cyprus is classified as ‘lagging’ because it is not allowed to join Schengen as a result of 
the Turkish Cyprus issue’s implications on border control policy (see also: Ker-Lindsay, 
2009: 448-449). Several other ‘newer’ member states have not yet joined the Euro and 
are also classified as ‘lagging’. Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia, on the other hand, 
are newer members that are not ‘lagging’ in their integration, so in this sense it will be 
interesting to see how they compare to the lagging new member states in terms of their 
DVs. 
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There are four ‘conscious’ differentiators – Sweden, Ireland, the UK and Denmark. 
They are spread across four classes in the classification. Sweden is the least differentiated 
with only a de facto opt-out on EMU4. Ireland has a lower X than Sweden because it is 
not integrated into Schengen and the CDSP/AFSJ areas but does take part in the 
Euro/EMU – unlike the UK. Therefore, the UK is classified as having an X lower by one 
class than Ireland. Finally, Denmark is classified as having the lowest X because they 
have the strongest differentiation in the most areas without having any opt-ins – unlike 
the UK and Ireland. This classification is in line with Adler-Nissen’s argument that the 
UK and Denmark are the “opt-out champions” – but they are not treated as equally 
differentiated for the above reasons (cf. Adler-Nissen, 2009: 64). The Czech Republic 
and Poland are the only new member states with a formal opt-out. 
 
Classification Member States N 
‘Highly Lagging’ X Bulgaria, Romania 2 
‘Lagging’ X Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 6 
Lowest X Denmark 1 
Lower X UK 1 
Low X Ireland 1 
Slightly Low X Sweden 1 
‘Normal’ X The rest 15 
Table 4: Classification of the IV – degrees of EU integration of member states 
 
Several ways of operationalising the independent variable are used here in order to 
check for partial effects. Every single existing differentiation has been included as a 
single variable – and also the conscious and lagging differentiators, the type of 
differentiation, and so on. For example, it might be the case that only opting out of the 
Euro has significant consequences for overall or DG-specific access. In that case using 
differentiation and lagging as whole IVs will not pinpoint this effect. This is done for 
differentiation on Schengen, EMU and AFSJ. 
Access is split on two dimensions to get the full picture. On the first dimension, 
access will be analysed as ‘access per member state’ (Y1) and ‘proportion of 
governmental access per member state’ (Y2). The second dimension is whether or not 
                                                
4 Snus is not the subject of a much debate outside Sweden, so it is not treated as significant here. 
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different DGs show varying ways wherein differentiated integration affects access. This 
is necessary to test H3. 
To examine the degree of access of the 27 member states, five new measures are 
made by the author. All these calculations are listed in Box 1, while the symbols will be 
explained in Table 5, below. Firstly, the analysis will examine whether the degree of 
access for each member state fits the so-called ‘community method’: a more 
supranational, consensus-seeking way of working (Devuyst, 2002: 110). The calculation 
for ‘fit’ with the community method examines whether or not the degrees of access equal 
the idea of ‘one state, one vote’ per state. Secondly and thirdly, the proportionality of 
access will be measured using both population size and Council voting weights (CVW) 
as measures of size. Fourthly, the ‘total fit’ of member states’ degrees of access with their 
expected degrees of access will be calculated by combining their returns based on their 
size and the community method. Finally, the relative presence of (central) government 
officials will be calculated per member state. 
 
Symbol Explanation 
A Presence of N of nationals of all member states on advisory committee: the measure of 
‘access’ 
AX Presence of N of nationals of member state ‘X’ on advisory committee 
Agov Presence of N of government representatives on advisory committees. 
P Total number of seats 
Gov’tX Presence of government employees of member state ‘X’ relative to non-government 
employees’ presence of member state ‘X’ 
Pop Population size of given member state 
FitComm How close is a state’s access on advisory committees to the ‘community ideal’? I.e. 
does access approach the one state = one vote principle? 
FitSize To what extent is a member state’s presence on advisory committees a reflection of its 
relative population size? 
FitPower To what extent is a member state’s presence on advisory committees a reflection of its 
relative voting weight, using CVW? 
CVW The official distribution of voting power in the EU Council of Ministers 
Table 5: Explaining the symbols used in Box 1 
 
Basically, the first three formulae in Box 1 are percentages – except TotalFitX and 
Gov’tx. The measures are constructed in a way that they represent ‘deviations from 0’: if 
a member state scores <0 on one measure, it means that they are ‘underrepresented’ there. 
For example, for FitCommx it would mean that if member state X has <0, it has less than 
the 1/27th of seats the ‘Community Method’ ideal expects. This would imply that the 
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country is underrepresented – or that the Community Method ideal is not the inspiration 
for access distribution. Similarly, if a member state has a score of >0 on one measure, it is 
punching above its weight regarding the expectations of that measure. In order to test H1 
and H2, the overall scores for the full dataset are calculated. In order to test H2 and H3, 
these measures are used per DG as well. 
The reason for including both the calculation of ‘fit’ with the Community Method and 
the fit with relative size and voting power lies in the scholarly debate on the nature of the 
EC: is it more of a supranational or more an intergovernmental arena (Quaglia, 2008: 
575; Thomson, 2008: 171; Egeberg, 2007: 140, 142, 151; Grøn & Wivel, 2011: 526; 
Puetter, 2008: 480; Juncos & Pomorska, 2008: 494)? This way of calculating access 
keeps open all possibilities and looks at the dominant factors in determining whether or 
not differentiated integration matters for degrees of access: differentiated integration 
might matter in different degrees for different states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1: Measuring access for member states, relative to the Community Method ideal, 
population size, voting weights and government versus non-government ratios 
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This paper tests its hypotheses using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). In 
addition to ‘predicting’ covariance, MLE is an estimation method, much like Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) (Eliason, 1993: 16). MLE assesses the probability of variation: it 
“maximises the likelihood of observing (...) [what is] actually observed” (Eliason, 1993: 
7-8). The figures located in the results section show the relation between IVs, covariates 
and the DV in a way that is similar to regression coefficients as used in OLS. Like in 
regression, coefficients can be negative and positive. Stronger coefficients show that the 
relation between two variables is ‘skewed’ in a particular direction – with significantly 
strong relations flagged. The factor analyses displayed in the results section show which 
variables (‘components’) are related most strongly and most uniformly. 
The reasons for using MLE in this paper are fourfold. Firstly, the common procedure 
for multivariate regression, OLS, assumes homoskedasticity and a normal distribution. 
This is not possible because this paper’s sample – the EU – is very heterogeneous. In fact, 
this heterogeneity is what caused differentiated integration in the first place, so analysing 
the effects of heterogeneity with a method that cannot deal with heterogeneity of its 
sample is illogical. Bollen & Jackman argue that small-N regressions can be more 
sensitive to skewing by a small part of the sample – which the heterogeneous sample 
used here is likely to have (1985: 511). MLE is generally known for robustness (Hox, 
2002: 37). Secondly, both the overall and the governmental proportion access measures 
in Box 1 are proportions, and the assumptions of “normality and homoskedasticity, are 
often violated when the dependent variable is a proportion” (Paolino, 2001: 325). 
Thirdly, MLE factor analysis is able to work both in an exploratory and a confirmatory 
way (Jöreskog, 1969: 183). Because several ways of operationalising differentiated 
integration are used in order to test specifically which differentiations influence access, 
MLE should suit this idea of combining exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. 
MLE is a useful tool to look for the best ‘fit’ by using rotations and simple models, 
gradually adding more factors for confirmatory testing (Jöreskog, 1969: 201). Fourthly 
and finally, the theory behind the analysis of differentiation is that both differentiation 
and lagging should have similar effects on access. MLE is able to pinpoint whether or not 
this is the case because it is a factor analysis, which pinpoints statistical commonalities 
between IVs on DV variance. The rotation method used here is oblique (direct oblimin) 
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because the IV, DV and intervening variables are likely to be interdependent (see also: 
Field, 2005: 636-637). 
The two main intervening variables used here are measures of member state ‘size’ 
(CVW and population size) and whether or not a member state has recently joined or not. 
In addition, several ways of operationalising the lagging and differentiation are used in 
order to tease out all possible patterns. Variable names and the different 
operationalisations of differentiation shown in the tables and appendices are explained in 
Appendix 2. 
 
Analysis 
In this section, the focus lays on the analysis used to answer whether or not H1, H2 and 
H3 hold. In order to answer whether or not the hypotheses hold, it is necessary to look at 
five attributes of ‘access’. Firstly, the absolute figures of access will be looked at. 
Secondly, the relative figures of access will be assessed – relative to population size, 
voting power and the Community Method ideal. Thirdly, this section examines whether 
or not H1 and H2 hold in terms of the overall picture of all committees. Fourthly, the two 
modes of Y: Y1 (overall access) and Y2 (government access) will be discussed. Finally, 
H2 and H3 will be tested by reviewing the relative and absolute distributions of access 
per DG. 
The main results on access are listed in Table 7, below. The member states are sorted 
according to CVW. The columns ‘diff’ and ‘lag’ correspond with the categorisation of 
differentiation Table 4, with ‘diff’ corresponding with the conscious differentiation and 
‘lag’ correspond with the ‘lagging’ states. When looking at Table 7, the first obvious 
pattern is that the bigger states have relatively (a lot) less access. Secondly, generally 
speaking, the government proportion (Y2) of most large and old states is lower. 
The implications of Table 7 for the aforementioned hypotheses are quite clear in two 
respects. Firstly, it seems that the dominant factor in determining access is ‘size’, rather 
than differentiated integration. Secondly, it seems that for the government proportion of 
access, size matters even more. In addition, new member states have a much higher 
government proportion: hypotheses concerning a ‘different Y2’ do not seem to hold. 
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member state cvw pop5 diff lag total N rel_27 rel_cvw rel_pop totalfit Y26 
France 8.41 65.05 . . 945 -6.83 -2.29 2.42 -6.7 0.63 
Germany 8.41 81.75 . . 1130 -8.95 -1.09 3.62 -6.42 0.65 
Italy 8.41 60.63 . . 844 -6.6 -2.94 1.77 -7.77 0.63 
UK 8.41 62.44 III . 897 -6.61 -2.6 2.11 -7.1 0.62 
Poland 7.83 38.2 . I 546 -4.06 -4.29 -0.16 -8.51 0.72 
Spain 7.83 46.15 . . 704 -4.63 -3.27 0.85 -7.05 0.65 
Romania 4.06 21.41 . II 456 -1.31 -1.11 -0.75 -3.17 0.77 
Netherlands 3.77 16.66 . . 660 0.96 0.5 0.57 2.03 0.69 
Belgium 3.48 10.95 . . 815 3.1 1.8 1.58 6.487 0.67 
Czech Rep. 3.48 10.53 . I 495 1.11 -0.27 -0.49 0.35 0.75 
Greece 3.48 11.31 . . 463 0.75 -0.48 -0.7 -0.43 0.72 
Hungary 3.48 9.99 . I 498 1.24 -0.26 -0.47 0.51 0.71 
Portugal 3.48 10.64 . . 493 1.07 -0.29 -0.51 0.27 0.71 
Austria 2.9 8.4 . . 573 2.04 0.81 -0.01 2.84 0.7 
Bulgaria 2.9 7.5 . II 432 1.31 -0.1 -0.9 0.31 0.78 
Sweden 2.9 9.42 I . 591 1.96 0.93 0.13 3.02 0.7 
Denmark 2.03 5.56 IIII . 495 2.1 1.18 -0.49 2.79 0.71 
Finland 2.03 5.38 . . 593 2.77 1.81 0.14 4.72 0.7 
Ireland 2.03 4.48 II . 487 2.26 1.12 -0.55 2.83 0.72 
Lithuania 2.03 3.24 . I 429 2.13 0.75 -0.92 1.96 0.78 
Slovakia 2.03 5.44 . . 445 1.8 0.85 -0.82 1.83 0.72 
Cyprus 1.16 0.8 . I 382 2.31 1.31 -1.23 2.39 0.77 
Estonia 1.16 1.34 . . 422 2.46 1.57 -0.97 3.06 0.77 
Latvia 1.16 2.23 . I 414 2.24 1.52 -1.02 2.74 0.77 
Luxembourg 1.16 0.51 . . 395 2.46 1.4 -1.14 2.72 0.75 
Slovenia 1.16 2.05 . . 456 2.54 1.79 -0.75 3.58 0.75 
Malta 0.87 0.42 . . 383 2.4 1.61 -1.22 2.79 0.8 
Table 7: Overall picture of member states’ access scores, sorted by CVW 
 
Hypothesis 1 
It appears that H1 (Y1) does not hold for older member states, since the UK is equal to 
other large states (as shown in Table 7) and Denmark, Ireland and Sweden have adequate 
access as well. However, both Denmark and Sweden score a lot worse than their Nordic 
neighbour Finland. For Hungary, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, the hypotheses seem 
to work better. Poland does worse than expected – potentially due to its relatively large 
size. For Romania and Bulgaria H1 seems to work, except that there is an unexpected 
                                                
5 Population in millions. 
6 Government proportion of all seats. 
7 In the Belgian federal arrangement, most powers are transferred to the sub-national political entities. Only 
the residual powers rest with the federal government (Deschouwer, 2009: pp. 9-10). This implies that often 
Belgium sends two or even three people whereas less decentralised member states (can) send only one. 
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difference between them. Thus, it appears that newer member states have more trouble 
compensating for the negative effects of lagging. 
In theory, H1 implicates that differentiation and lagging (as described in Table 4) 
should work in the same way: predicting a significantly negative effect on the quantity of 
access of member states (Y1) or on relative government access (Y2). The statistical 
analysis below answers what effect differentiated integration and lagging in integration 
have on access – and whether these effects are similar. 
Table 8 (below) shows that neither lagging nor differentiation is significantly 
associated with overall degrees of access. The main determinant of access on the overall 
level appears to be member state size – with CVW the best ‘fit’ with access degrees. A 
simple dummy denoting only member states with >60 million inhabitants also shows that 
the four largest states have far less access than their size would suggest. However, the 
fact that this relation is weaker than that of the CVW and pure population measures for 
the whole sample shows that this effect is more widespread than just among the four 
largest states. Based on the information in Table 8, it is clear that the strict version of H1 
(Y1) must be rejected here. Especially conscious differentiation appears to have no 
relation whatsoever with overall levels of access. ‘Size’ and the aforementioned 
‘Community Method’ ideals appear to be the dominant pattern in determining overall 
degrees of access, as shown in Table 9 (further below). If proportionality of access is 
offset against this 1/27 access distribution, it clearly shows that mitigating the effects of 
size is an important directive in allocating access. This linearity of the relation between 
access and the two measures of size is shown in Appendix 3a. 
 
Variable 1 [1.476] 2 [ 19.050**] 3 [ 177.805**] Factor 1 Factor 2 
lag -.089 (.629) -.089 (.629) -.089 (.629) .163 .799 
diff -.013 (1.006) -.013 (1.006) -.013 (1.006) -.068 -.303 
old_new  .137 (.506) .137 (.506) .388 .673 
large_yesno   -.918** (2.626) -.956 .099 
pop_millions   -.881** (23.519) -.999 -.002 
CVW   .686** (.362) .882 .168 
totalfit 
(dependent) 
   .883 -.321 
Dependent Variable: totalfit. * p < .05. ** p <.01. Model N: 27. Univariate standard deviations in 
parentheses. Model Bartlett’s χ2 in brackets behind model numbers. Rotation method: direct oblimin. 
Factors that have loaded together are highlighted. 
Table 8: H1 (Y1): are lagging and differentiation similar? 
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Table 9 shows that while the dominant pattern is ‘size’, it also shows that, generally 
speaking, newer members have less access than older ones. Closer statistical analysis 
shows that one reason for this is that newer member states are significantly smaller than 
older member states (as shown in Appendix 3b). As such, this relation appears to be 
spurious. However, one can still say that lagging is negatively related with access in 
proportion to the Community Method, since lagging is unrelated to member state size 
(see Appendix 3b). This pattern is diametrically opposed to the idea of H2, which 
proposes that conscious differentiation should have more of an impact than lagging since 
differentiation is a ‘harder’ and more permanent form of differentiated integration than 
lagging. 
 
Variable 1 [279.343**] 1 [239.400**] 
lag -.368* (.629) -.128 (.629) 
diff .102 (.1006) .002 (.1006) 
old_new -.585** (.506) .148 (.506) 
CVW .821** (2.6265) -.910** (2.6265) 
pop_millions .887** (23.519) -.795** (23.519) 
large_yesno -.832** (.362) .543** (.362) 
 Dependent Variable: prop_27. Dependent Variable: prop_CVW. 
* p < .05. ** p <.01. Model N: 27. Univariate standard deviations in parentheses.  
Model Bartlett’s χ2 in brackets behind model numbers. 
Table 9: Overall degrees of access with relaxed assumptions on differentiation 
 
The final part of H1 is the ‘different’ Y2, expecting lower government proportions for 
differentiated and lagging member states. Table 7 has already shown that it is highly 
unlikely that this is the case, since newer member states have much higher government 
proportions. This relation is examined in detail in Appendix 3c. Much like H1 (Y1), H1 
(Y2) shows that there is no simultaneous effect for lagging and differentiation. Again, 
larger member states have fewer seats – both non-governmental and governmental ones. 
Moreover, newer member states have higher government proportions – including lagging 
ones. In this sense, H1 (Y2) is indeed the same as H1 (Y1): lagging and differentiation do 
not work similarly. The key pattern that emerges when taking apart government 
proportions is that this relation is not what Y2 should be looking for. It clearly appears 
that new member states have lower non-government access to advisory committees. This 
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is completely in line with the aforementioned argument that most new EU-27 members 
have an underdeveloped civil society (Heard-Lauréote, 2008:  595). Appendix 3c shows 
that this is especially true for lagging new member states. At the same time, newer 
member states score worse in terms of government representation. So their government 
proportion might be higher, but this does not mean that the amount of seats allocated to 
new member states’ governments is proportional to their size. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
According to H2, there must be a difference between the different types of differentiated 
integration, with stronger differentiation having stronger negative effects on access. As 
shown above in Table 7 and the related discussion, this argument is undermined by the 
fact that lagging seems to have more of a relation with lower degrees of access than 
differentiation. Conscious differentiation appears to have less impact on access, despite 
being a ‘stronger’ form of differentiation than ‘lagging’. Moreover, it does not appear 
that Denmark and the UK are ‘shunned’ more than their Irish and Swedish counterparts 
despite having stronger and more differentiations. 
In order for H2 (Y1) to be true, consciously differentiated non-Euro members must 
have lower degrees of access than Eurozone countries. Those who do not have the Euro 
because they are lagging members should be between these two categories in terms of 
access, because lagging is a weaker form of differentiation but a form of differentiation 
nonetheless. As such, there should be a different effect for differentiation and lagging in 
the first model – rather than the simultaneous effect that is necessary for H1. This logic is 
followed in all three analyses for H2: on DG ECOFIN; on DG Taxation and Customs 
(DG TAXC); and on DG AFSJ. The MLE analyses then look for a) autonomous effects 
of ‘all’ differentiations on access; b) differences between conscious and lagging 
differentiations; c) differences between the different legal forms of differentiation; and, 
finally, d) differences between the three aforementioned DGs. 
Table 10 (below) examines this relative impact of stronger differentiation on EMU-
related access. In order to ‘confirm’ this hypothesis, statistical analysis should show that 
the effect of differentiation on access should be higher for conscious differentiators (UK, 
Sweden, Denmark) and even more so for the conscious formal opt-out states (UK, 
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Denmark). Therefore, four different operationalisations of EMU differentiation have been 
employed. Firstly, the overall effect of all differentiations on access is checked. There is a 
variable for all conscious non-EMU members. Thirdly, lagging non-members of the 
EMU are coded in a dummy variable. Finally, there is a category for conscious À la carte 
differentiation. Table 10 then shows that while the strongest effect on access is member 
state size, again, not being a member of the EMU decreases access to EMU-related 
advisory committees. However, H2 (Y1) must be rejected here because formally opting 
out and consciously opting out of EMU membership has no significant effect on access. 
Instead, it appears that lagging on EMU membership has a more distinctly negative effect 
on access to EMU-related advisory committees. This can be seen on the right-hand side 
of Table 10. These results closely echo the outcomes for H1. 
 
Variable 1 [ 129.395**]  Variable 2 [102.250**] 
euro_opt -.171 (.267)  euro_conscious -.193 (.6405) 
euro_yesno -.362* (.492)  euro_lag -.260 (.447) 
euro_conscious -.193 (.6405)  CVW -.504** (2.6265) 
CVW -.504** (2.6265)  pop_millions -.374* (23.519) 
pop_millions -.374* (23.519)  old_new .298 (.506) 
old_new .298 (.506)    
Dependent Variable: totaldiff_ecof. * p < .05. ** p <.01. Model N: 27. Univariate standard deviations in 
parentheses. Model Bartlett’s χ2 in brackets behind model numbers. Rotation method: Direct Oblimin. 
Factors that have loaded together are highlighted. 
Table 10: The effects of EMU differentiation on H2 (Y1) 
 
As shown in Appendix 3d, for DG TAXC the pattern expected by H2 (Y1) does not 
hold. There is no significant factor for either stronger differentiation, or for any 
differentiation whatsoever. One factor in this might be the relatively small size of the DG 
itself in terms of advisory committees8, so that it is hard to have any differences at all. 
For DG AFSJ, Y2 must be rejected in a fashion similar to the rejection of DG TAXC. 
On the one hand, the DG’s advisory committees have a lot more seats (>400 instead of 
<150), but it appears that differentiation on AFSJ has no specific effect on access to 
AFSJ-related committees. On the other hand, the effect of full opt-out differentiation is 
even smaller than the effect of the opt-in/opt-out differentiation, as shown in Appendix 
3d. This amounts to a strong backing for alternative hypotheses, such as the ability of 
                                                
8 <150 seats for all advisory committees linked to this DG, as shown in Appendix 1. 
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member states like Denmark and Sweden to compensate adequately for their 
differentiations. Another possibility is the idea that in the AFSJ area, the difference 
between the opt-in/opt-out differentiations and the full opt-out differentiations is 
impossible to spot legally. Fletcher argues that the opt-in/opt-out arrangement of the UK 
and Ireland is a very complicated legal differentiation, with more of a cosmetic or 
symbolic effect than a legal effect (2009: p. 95). As such, the effects for H2 might be 
minimal – which they are. 
The final part of this hypothesis concerns the effect of the relative strength of 
differentiation on the government proportion of access (Y2). It is unlikely that statistical 
analysis would agree with H2 (Y2), given the fact that Appendix 4 already shows there 
are no differences between states in this respect, and if there are, they run counter to the 
expectations. For DG ECOFIN, it appears that the statistical results are diametrically 
opposed to the hypothesis. This is clarified in Appendix 3e. Differentiation on DG 
ECOFIN results in a higher Y2 instead of a lower one. However, of all EMU-
differentiated countries, those with multispeed differentiation or a lagging EMU 
integration, the effect is the most positive on Y2.  
For both DG TAXC and DG AFSJ, differentiated integration has no negative effect 
on the government proportion of access (Y2). This is shown in more detail in Appendix 
3f. Conscious differentiation has no bigger effect than lagging differentiation for DG 
TAXC, and full opt-outs have no bigger effect than case-by-case opt-outs for DG AFSJ. 
Rather surprisingly, in both instances the effect of the less strong differentiation was 
‘stronger’ negative. However, the coefficients are so small that this result is negligible. 
One of the mechanisms behind this is the possibility that there simply is no effect because 
the DGs are not so big, and not among the main EC domains. As such, H2 (Y2) is 
rejected for DGs ECOFIN, TAXC and AFSJ. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
H3 argues that access levels and government proportions are more strongly affected by 
differentiated integration if the DG you look at is related to that particular differentiation.  
H3 (Y1) implies that within DGs ECOFIN, AFSJ and TAXC, access should be lower for 
states that have differentiated integration related to these particular DGs. As shown in the 
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discussion of H2 this is not the case for DGs AFSJ and TAXC regarding both Y1 and Y2. 
For DG ECOFIN, H3 (Y2) must be rejected as well, as shown in Appendix 3e. However, 
the discussion of H2 has already shown that differentiating on EMU integration in any 
configuration has a negative effect on access to DG ECOFIN. When one looks at Table 
10, it is clear that this effect of EMU differentiation on access to DG ECOFIN is mainly 
caused by the lagging states. Similar to the results for H1, it appears that lagging states 
see most effects of their differentiation than conscious states. Nonetheless, it appears that 
EMU-related differentiation has the strongest negative effect on access of any main IV 
used here. This result is no surprise given the aforementioned Adler-Nissen argument that 
EMU integration is unique in how big the effects of differentiated integration are (2009:  
64). In sum, H3 has to be rejected in terms of Y2, that there is no negative effect of 
differentiated integration effect on government proportions. In terms of Y1 it seems that 
H3 is supported only by advisory committees related to DG ECOFIN. This is not as 
surprising given widespread belief that differentiation on EMU has the most profound 
impact on institutional structures of the EU and on member states. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper sought to shed more light on the consequences of differentiated integration, by 
focussing on the distribution of access to EC advisory committees among member states. 
While differentiated integration itself is a major topic for EU scholars, inadequate 
attention has been given to measuring tangible consequences for differentiating states 
(Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012). By conducting an MLE analysis of access to 
advisory committees, this paper has found several striking patterns. This conclusion 
examines the impact of the findings presented in this paper, as well as indicating where 
future research seems warranted. 
The main impact of the results presented here is that normative and theoretical claims 
on the dire effects of differentiation appear to be unfounded empirically. However, the 
main result that is in line with these views is that even in the EC advisory committees the 
Eurogroup is an exclusive group, effectively keeping non-members out of EMU-related 
arenas. Crucially, moving the EMU into closer cooperation on economic and budgetary 
matters is one of the main contemporary options for EU widening and deepening – 
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especially since the current EMU structures are not deemed to be suitable to tackle the 
current economic crisis. This enhanced cooperation is likely to bring along more 
differentiation as well (Piris, 2012: 143). This, in turn, would strengthen the effects of 
differentiation on access already found by this analysis on EMU-related access.  
Secondly, it appears access has less to do with differentiation, rather than simply 
being a new EU member. Newer members generally have less access across the board, 
and lagging new members even less so. These findings support the claim by some authors 
that newer member states have weaker civil society and are thus underrepresented in 
some arenas. At the same time, it is necessary to partially reject the notion that the EC is 
adamant newer member states are represented well. One main entrance for further 
research in this would be to reassess new members’ access in a longitudinal analysis: is 
this effect (gradually) disappearing or not? If not, there could be a problem in terms of 
influence for newer member states.  
The final – and perhaps most important – main contribution of this paper is that it 
shows quite clearly that the dominant causal factor in determining access to EC advisory 
committees is some sort of Community Method-based EC logic that tries to take the 
middle ground between size, power and a fair 1/27 distribution of seats. Contrary to what 
Grøn & Wivel believe, the EC still has a strong supranationalist effect in terms of access 
distribution (cf. Grøn & Wivel, 2011:  523). It appears that the prominent 
supranationalist/intergovernmentalist debate in EU politics must be settled in favour of 
the EC being slightly more supranationalist in allocating seats on advisory committees. 
Further research on this particular subject should – among other things – focus on 
disentangling the obfuscating effects of the heterogeneity of the cases on the dependent 
variables. Secondly, further research should delve deeper into the nature, origins and 
effects of the relatively low degree of access for new member states – lagging new 
member states and non-lagging new member states alike. The main question that remains 
from the results of this paper in this respect is whether this is a (semi-)permanent pattern 
or a pattern caused by a period of adaptation. If this is a structural issue for some new 
entrants, this might lead to negative consequences associated with low access in the 
theory section of this paper. Moreover, new enlargement is not out of the question – and 
in order to learn from the present problems regarding integration of new member states, 
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this phenomenon can be a valuable lesson. Thirdly, further research on the broader 
subject of the effect of differentiated integration on informal power of member states 
should include other arenas of EU governance to provide a better picture of a more high-
politics area like AFSJ or Schengen. Fourthly and finally, further research into the unique 
nature of the EMU-related areas might yield huge insights into the workings of 
differentiated integration as a model or as a problem. It appears that of all areas of 
differentiation, EMU-related differentiation has by far the biggest impact on the EU’s 
political arenas. This paper adds weight to that observation shared by many scholars, 
administrators and politicians alike. 
In sum, this paper has shed light on the effects of differentiated integration for the 
informal power resources of individual member states – and differentially integrated 
member states as a whole. While for the older differentially integrated member states the 
picture has not become clear, this paper still yields valuable insights into the effects of 
differentiated integration. In terms of access, the biggest negative effect can be found for 
committees related to EMU differentiation. In other respects, this paper has yielded 
insights into the supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism debate; raised a potential 
concern on new member states’ degrees of access; and, crucially, tested the limits and 
possibilities of large-N analysis with regard to the specific field of differentiated 
integration. Differentiated integration might not have the dramatic, tangible effects on 
member states’ interests predicted by some, but some effects are quite clear – and 
potentially problematic if member states’ compensatory strategies fail to keep the adverse 
effects of differentiated integration at bay. This paper has delivered a preliminary 
analysis on tangible consequences of differentiated integration, something that ought to 
have been studied before (Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012; Adler-Nissen, 2008: 664; 
Kölliker, 2006: 3). While the jury is still out on the precise overall effects of 
differentiated integration, the stark contrasts in access to EMU-related areas pinpoints to 
the dangers of the EU moving towards a genuine two-speed Europe based on Eurozone 
integration (Piris, 2012: 6). Given the fact that especially the ‘lagging’ new member 
states are hit in terms of access, European integration must address this problem in order 
for the EU27 to steer clear of what Piris fearfully calls “two-class Europe” (2012: 6-7). 
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Appendix 
 
EC DG Related differentiations N of total 
seats per 
DG 
Agriculture and rural development DG 
(AGRI) 
 1285 
Budget DG (BUDG)  7 
Bureau of European policy advisers (BUR)  44 
Development DG (DEVE)  469 
Economic and financial affairs DG (ECOF) EMU 542 
Education and culture DG (EDUC)  1683 
Employment, social affairs and equal 
opportunities DG (EMPL) 
Social Charter / Charter of 
Fundamental Human Rights 
1506 
Energy and transport DG (ENTR)  1335 
Enlargement DG (ENLA)  13 
Enterprise and Industry DG (INDU)  3464 
Environment DG (ENVI)  1579 
EuropeAid (EAID)  49 
European anti-fraud office (FRAU)  116 
Eurostat (STAT)  84 
Health and consumer protection DG 
(HEAL) 
Snus 2103 
Humanitarian aid DG (HUMA)  173 
Human resources and security DG (HRES)  14 
Information society and media DG (INFO)  1162 
Internal market and services DG (MRKT)  953 
Justice, freedom and security DG (AFSJ) AFSJ, CDSP, Charter of 
Fundamental Human Rights, 
Snus, Schengen 
444 
Maritime affairs and fisheries DG (FISH)  88 
Publications office (PUBL)  33 
Regional policy DG (REGP)  95 
Research DG (RESE)  2425 
Secretariat General (SeGe)  75 
Taxation and Customs Union DG (TAXC) Schengen 147 
Translation DG (TRLA)  60 
Appendix 1: All European Commission DGs (and their abbreviations as  used here) and 
differentiations in integration related to their field of work, also listing the total number 
of seats per DG 
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Main IVs – Variable name Explanation Coding 
lag Denotes all lagging states as 
explained in Table 4 
{0 = no lag/old states, 1 = lag category I, 2 
= lag category II} 
diff Denotes all differentiated 
states as explained in Table 
4 
{0 = no diff/new states, 1 = diff category I, 
2 = diff category II, 3 = diff category III, 4 
= diff category IV} 
Main covariates and intervening variables 
CVW Council voting weights (%) 
pop_millions Population size in millions 
old_new Old/new states dichotomy {0 = EU15, 1 = new member state} 
large_yesno Dichotomy for large states (>60 million 
population) 
{0 = yes, 1 = no}9 
Main dependent variables 
totalfit TotalFitx 
Gov_vs_nongov Relative proportion of governmental seats (Gov’tx) 
gov_fit Overall access score of governmental seats per member state – relative measure, 
calculated like TotalFitx 
nongov_fit Overall access score of non-governmental seats per member state – relative measure, 
calculated like TotalFitx 
DG-specific variables 
euro_opt Full opt-out of Eurozone membership {0 = no/new member state, 1 = À la carte 
differentiation on Eurozone membership} 
euro_lag Lagging non-membership of the 
Eurozone 
{0 = no/old member state, 1 = new 
member state lagging on EMU} 
euro_yesno All member states that are not in the 
Eurozone. 
{0 = no, 1 = all member states that are not 
a part of the Eurozone} 
euro_conscious Conscious differentiation of 
Eurozone membership. 
{0 = no/new member state, 1 = conscious 
differentiation} 
euro_multispeed Multispeed differentiation of 
Eurozone membership (see Table 4). 
{0 = no, 1 = multispeed differentiation} 
Schengen_conscious Dichotomy denoting whether a state 
is differentiated on Schengen 
{0 = no, 1 = consciously not in Schengen} 
Schengen_yesno Dichotomy denoting whether a state 
is differentiated on Schengen 
{0 = no, 1 = not a part of Schengen} 
afsj_yesno Dichotomy denoting whether a state is 
differentiated on DG AFSJ 
{0 = no, 1 = not a part of AFSJ} 
afsj_full Dichotomy denoting whether a state has a full 
opt-out on AFSJ matters (Table 4). 
{0 = no + UK + Ireland, 1 = 
Denmark & Sweden} 
totaldiff_ecof TotalFitx score for DG ECOFIN 
totaldiff_taxc TotalFitx score for DG TAXC 
totaldiff_afsj TotalFitx score for DG AFSJ 
seats_ECOF Relative share of Government access for member states on DG ECOFIN 
seats_TAXC Relative share N of Government access for member states on DG TAXC 
seats_AFSJ Relative share N of Government access for member states on DG AFSJ 
Appendix 2: Explanation of all variable names used in tables and appendices 
                                                
9 This particular variable might seem like it is coded the wrong way around, given the fact that it is coded 
the other way when compared to other ‘state size’ variables. However, this is not the case, because it is 
coded in the same direction as other ‘yes/no’ variables in order to avoid confusion on that part. 
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Appendix 3a: Linearity of the relation between access and member state size (CVW, pop) 
 
 
 old_new CVW  CVW Lag 
Pearson 
Correlation
10 
 -.380 Spearman's 
rho11 
1.000 -0.25 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
 .050* Significance 
(2-tailed) 
 .902 
old_new 
N 27 27 
 
CVW 
N 27 27 
Appendix 3b: Correlation between independent variables and covariates (* p < .05) 
 
 
Variable 1  [176.344**] 2 [186.758**] 3  [151,012**] 
lag .528** (.629) .039 (.629) -.392* (.629) 
diff -.252 (1.006) -.063 (1.006) -.116 (1.006) 
old_new .747** (.506) .237 (.506) -.284 (.506) 
CVW -.789** (2.6265) -.931** (2.6265) -.577** (2.6265) 
pop_millions -.775** (23.519) -.950** (23.519) -.571** (23.519) 
large_yesno .699** (.362) .813** (.362) .399* (.362) 
 Dependent: gov_vs_nongov Dependent: govfit Dependent: nongovfit 
Dependent Variable: totalfit. * p < .05. ** p <.01. Model N: 27. Univariate standard errors in parentheses. 
Model Bartlett’s χ2 in brackets behind model numbers. 
Appendix 3c: H1 (Y2): government proportions 
 
 
                                                
10 CVW is an interval/ratio level variable. Since old_new is a dichotomy, it can be treated as an 
interval/ratio level variable as a result. Therefore, Pearson Correlation is an appropriate correlation 
coefficient. 
11 Lag is an ordinal variable and therefore it is necessary to use Spearman’s rho as the correlation 
coefficient. 
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Variable 1 [121.894**]  Variable 2 [85.187**] 
Schengen_conscious -.034 (.2593)  afsj_yesno -.137 (.362) 
Schengen_yesno -.034 (.19)  afsj_full -.110 (.267) 
CVW -.372* (2.6265)  CVW -.233 (2.6265) 
pop_millions  -.235 (23.519)  pop_millions  -.118 (23.519) 
old_new  .172 (.506)  old_new  .081 (.506) 
Dependent Variable: totaldiff_taxc  Dependent Variable: totaldiff_afsj 
* p < .05. ** p <.01. Model N: 27. Univariate standard deviations in parentheses. Model Bartlett’s χ2 in 
brackets behind model numbers. 
Appendix 3d: Testing H2 (Y1) for DGs TAXC and AFSJ 
 
Variable 1 [145.740**]  Variable 2 [99.180**] 
euro_opt .285 (.267)  euro_conscious .401* (.6405) 
euro_lag .427* (.447)  euro_multispeed .522** (.465) 
euro_yesno .648** (.492)  CVW -.223 (2.6265) 
CVW -.223 (2.6265)  pop_millions  -.228 (23.519) 
pop_millions  -.228 (23.519)  old_new  .465** (.506) 
old_new  .465** (.506)    
Dependent Variable: seats_ecof  Dependent Variable: seats_ecof 
* p < .05. ** p <.01. Model N: 27. Univariate standard deviations in parentheses. Model Bartlett’s χ2 in 
brackets behind model numbers. 
Appendix 3e: Testing H2 (Y2) for DG ECOFIN 
 
Variable 1 [116.347**]  Variable 2 [83.085**] 
Schengen_conscious -.163 (.2593)  afsj_yesno -.114 (.362) 
Schengen_yesno -.194 (.19)  afsj_full .086 (.267) 
CVW -.210 (2.6265)  CVW .036 (2.6265) 
pop_millions  -.242 (23.519)  pop_millions  -.011 (23.519) 
old_new  .165 (.506)  old_new  .193 (.506) 
Dependent Variable: seats_taxc  Dependent Variable: seats_afsj 
* p < .05. ** p <.01. Model N: 27. Univariate standard deviations in parentheses. Model Bartlett’s χ2 in 
brackets behind model numbers. 
Appendix 3f: Testing H2 (Y2) for DGs TAXC and AFSJ 
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STATE 
Seats 
AGRI 
Seats 
DEVE 
Seats 
ECOF 
Seats 
EDUC 
Seats 
EMPL 
Seats 
ENTR 
Seats 
INDU 
Seats 
ENVI 
Seats 
HEAL 
AUT 1 1 0,9 0,6 0,67 0,69 0,83 0,78 0,57 
BEL 1 0,76 0,79 0,65 0,63 0,59 0,8 0,88 0,54 
BUL 1 1 0,92 0,7 0,72 0,84 0,89 0,7 0,7 
CYP 1 1 0,86 0,65 0,71 0,85 0,9 0,76 0,63 
CZE 1 1 0,89 0,68 0,67 0,84 0,87 0,73 0,73 
DEN 1 1 0,91 0,67 0,69 0,78 0,82 0,71 0,55 
EST 1 1 0,95 0,67 0,67 0,86 0,84 0,76 0,63 
FIN 1 1 0,82 0,65 0,73 0,74 0,82 0,71 0,7 
FRA 0,37 0,94 0,79 0,69 0,65 0,59 0,84 0,73 0,64 
GER 1 1 0,8 0,58 0,63 0,67 0,85 0,77 0,6 
GRE 1 0,82 0,79 0,73 0,7 0,79 0,87 0,64 0,69 
HUN 1 1 0,83 0,64 0,68 0,79 0,86 0,67 0,6 
IRE 1 1 0,83 0,61 0,72 0,8 0,87 0,67 0,62 
ITA 1 1 0,88 0,66 0,52 0,64 0,87 0,77 0,6 
LAT 1 1 0,94 0,62 0,72 0,86 0,88 0,74 0,63 
LIT 1 1 0,91 0,69 0,64 0,84 0,93 0,77 0,68 
LUX 1 1 0,87 0,65 0,73 0,77 0,89 0,72 0,71 
MAL 1 1 0,88 0,75 0,65 0,95 0,91 0,84 0,65 
NET 1 1 0,84 0,51 0,63 0,7 0,85 0,83 0,65 
POL 1 1 0,91 0,59 0,68 0,81 0,9 0,79 0,65 
POR 1 0,91 0,8 0,68 0,63 0,79 0,88 0,71 0,57 
ROM 1 1 0,94 0,7 0,74 0,81 0,9 0,76 0,68 
SVK 1 1 0,88 0,68 0,68 0,83 0,88 0,78 0,6 
SVN 0,91 1 0,84 0,62 0,83 0,73 0,85 0,74 0,7 
SPA 1 1 0,81 0,67 0,54 0,66 0,83 0,64 0,62 
SWE 1 1 0,94 0,65 0,77 0,77 0,8 0,78 0,63 
UK 1 1 0,93 0,57 0,64 0,61 0,82 0,81 0,73 
Appendix 4: Government proportions per DG (differentiation-related DGs are 
highlighted, as are the differentiators and their scores) 
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STATE 
Seats 
INFO 
Seats 
MRKT 
Seats 
AFSJ 
Seats 
FISH 
Seats 
REGP 
Seats 
RESE 
seats 
TAXC 
AUT 0,88 0,48 0,86  0,33 0,44 0,33 
BEL 0,67 0,53 0,9 0 0,2 0,56 0,4 
BUL 0,91 0,6 1  0,33 0,74 0,5 
CYP 0,92 0,65 1  0,33 0,55 0,5 
CZE 0,79 0,56 0,83  0,33 0,52 0,5 
DEN 0,71 0,56 1 0 0,33 0,57 0,67 
EST 0,86 0,62 1 1 0,33 0,65 0,5 
FIN 0,84 0,43 1 0 0,33 0,49 0,33 
FRA 0,63 0,33 0,77 0,13 0,33 0,48 0,43 
GER 0,74 0,38 0,94 0,33 0,33 0,35 0,29 
GRE 0,85 0,57 0,75 0 0,33 0,51 0,67 
HUN 0,82 0,52 1  0,33 0,44 0,5 
IRE 0,71 0,59 0,8 0 0,5 0,53 0,5 
ITA 0,55 0,38 0,98 0 0,33 0,36 0,67 
LAT 0,87 0,77 0,43 1 0,5 0,69 0,5 
LIT 0,87 0,68 1 1 0,25 0,61 0,5 
LUX 0,91 0,57 0,75  0,33 0,56 0,5 
MAL 0,9 0,6 1  0,33 0,74 0,67 
NET 0,8 0,32 0,88 0 0,33 0,44 0,75 
POL 0,76 0,46 1  0,33 0,49 0,5 
POR 0,79 0,56 1 0,75 0,33 0,51 0,5 
ROM 0,83 0,65 1  0,33 0,58 0,33 
SVK 0,87 0,67 1  0,33 0,59 0,67 
SVN 0,86 0,6 1  0,33 0,51 0,67 
SPA 0,82 0,37 1 0,6 0,33 0,4 0,5 
SWE 0,73 0,42 0,9 0,33 0,33 0,47 0,33 
UK 0,69 0,18 0,8 0,21 0,33 0,32 0,44 
Appendix 4 (continued): Government proportions per DG (differentiation-related DGs 
are highlighted, as are the differentiated states and their scores) 
